CVE-2026-66801
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Description
A flaw was found in multicluster-global-hub. An attacker who compromises a managed hub can leverage its legitimate Kafka client certificate to publish a CloudEvent (a specification for describing event data in a common way) message to the shared gh-spec topic. This message can spoof its source as "global-hub" and target other managed hubs. Due to a lack of binding between the Kafka client principal and the CloudEvent envelope, the agent on the targeted hub accepts this spoofed message and applies arbitrary resources. This vulnerability allows for fleet-wide cluster-admin privilege escalation across all managed hubs.
Statement
Critical: The default Strimzi transport in Multicluster Global Hub is vulnerable to privilege escalation. A compromised managed hub can exploit weak Kafka Write ACLs on the shared gh-spec topic and spoofed CloudEvent sources to gain cluster-admin privileges across the entire fleet of managed hubs. This allows an attacker to achieve fleet-wide administrative control from a single compromised leaf hub.
Mitigation
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Additional information
- This content is not included.Bugzilla 2508045: multicluster-global-hub: Cross-hub lateral movement via shared spec-topic Write ACL and spoofable CloudEvent identity
- Content from cwe.mitre.org is not included.CWE-290: Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
Affected Packages and Issued Red Hat Security Errata
Unless explicitly stated as not affected, all previous versions of packages in any minor update stream of a product listed here should be assumed vulnerable, although may not have been subject to full analysis.
| Products / Services | Components | State | Errata |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multicluster Global Hub 1.4.5 | multicluster-globalhub/multicluster-globalhub-rhel9-operator | Fixed | RHSA-2026:55810 |
| Multicluster Global Hub 1.6.5 | multicluster-globalhub/multicluster-globalhub-rhel9-operator | Fixed | RHSA-2026:54392 |
| Multicluster Global Hub 1.7.0 | multicluster-globalhub/multicluster-globalhub-rhel9-operator | Fixed | RHSA-2026:53530 |
| Multicluster Global Hub 1.8.0 | multicluster-globalhub/multicluster-globalhub-rhel9-operator | Fixed | RHSA-2026:52946 |
| Red Hat multicluster global hub 1.5.1 | multicluster-globalhub/multicluster-globalhub-rhel9-operator | Fixed | RHSA-2026:54577 |
| No matching records found | |||
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) Score Details
Important note
CVSS scores for open source components depend on vendor-specific factors (e.g. version or build chain). Therefore, Red Hat's score and impact rating can be different from NVD and other vendors. Red Hat remains the authoritative CVE Naming Authorities (CNA) source for its products and services (see Red Hat classifications ).
CVSS v3 Score Breakdown
| Red Hat | NVD | cve.org | |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVSS v3 Base Score | 9.9 | N/A | N/A |
| Attack Vector | Network | N/A | N/A |
| Attack Complexity | Low | N/A | N/A |
| Privileges Required | Low | N/A | N/A |
| User Interaction | None | N/A | N/A |
| Scope | Changed | N/A | N/A |
| Confidentiality Impact | High | N/A | N/A |
| Integrity Impact | High | N/A | N/A |
| Availability Impact | High | N/A | N/A |
CVSS v3 Vector
Red Hat CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Red Hat CVSS v3 Score Explanation
9.9 Critical. PR:L — attacker needs authenticated access to any one managed hub (namespace-admin or compromised agent pod). S:C — compromised hub-A's Kafka principal is scoped to hub-A, but the attack crosses into hub-B and all other managed hubs fleet-wide. AC:L — no race conditions or special configuration needed; the shared Write ACL on gh-spec and the absent principal-to-source binding are default-on in Strimzi transport mode.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is Red Hat's CVSS v3 score or Impact different from other vendors?
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My product is listed as "Under investigation" or "Affected", when will Red Hat release a fix for this vulnerability?
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- "Affected" means that our Analysis Team has determined that this product is affected by this vulnerability and might release a fix to address this in the near future.
What can I do if my product is listed as "Will not fix"?
Available options depend mostly on the Impact of the vulnerability and the current Life Cycle phase of your product. Overall, you have the following options:
- Upgrade to a supported product version that includes a fix for this vulnerability (recommended).
- Apply a mitigation (if one exists).
- Open a This content is not included.support case to request a prioritization of releasing a fix for this vulnerability.
What can I do if my product is listed as "Fix deferred"?
Available options depend mostly on the Impact of the vulnerability and the current Life Cycle phase of your product. Overall, you have the following options:
- Apply a mitigation (if one exists).
- Open a This content is not included.support case to request a prioritization of releasing a fix for this vulnerability.
- Red Hat Engineering focuses on addressing high-priority issues based on their complexity or limited lifecycle support. Therefore, lower-priority issues will not receive immediate fixes.
What is a mitigation?
I have a Red Hat product but it is not in the above list, is it affected?
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